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INTRODUCTION

In April 2010, the State of Virginia filed a lawsuit' to challenge the
* Principal Attorney, Pacific Legal Foundation. J.D. 2002, Chapman University School of
Law; B.A. 1998, Hillsdale College. Thanks to my colleagues Damien Schiff, Joshua Thompson,
and Deborah J. La Fetra for helpful suggestions.
1. Commonwealth ex reL Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010),
rev'd,656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3716 (2012).
311
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constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA). 2 Similar lawsuits were filed by 26 other states. 3 But what
made Virginia's case different than the many others challenging
PPACA was that Virginia was challenging the constitutionality of the
Individual Mandate provision of PPACA 4 on its own behalf, and not on
behalf of any individual. That state had recently passed the Virginia
Health Care Freedom Act (VHCFA),5 a statute declaring no person
could be forced to buy health insurance against her will. A complaint
was filed by Virginia seeking declaratory relief to determine whether
the VHCFA was preempted by the federal law.
The case quickly turned to the question of standing: may a state,
consistent with Article III of the Constitution, 6 sue the federal
government on the grounds that a federal law exceeds Congress's
constitutional authority? Although the district court ruled that Virginia
had standing,7 that decision was reversed by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, 8 which concluded that the state was trying to bring a parens9
v. Mellon.
patriae lawsuit forbidden by the precedent of Massachusetts
Although states may in some circumstances challenge federal
interference with their right to maintain their own legal codes, the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the VHCFA did not seek to implement a state
program or regulate individual behavior.10 Thus, the state was not
seeking to defend its own rights, but to defend the rights of citizens,
which it may not do.
This conclusion raises a number of problems, and implicates a larger
question of the federalist structure. The Constitution's authors, not
anticipating the twentieth century's radical growth of federal authority,
expected states and the federal government to operate in dynamic
tension with one another, creating a centripetal force that would resist
federal expansion. Although the authors of The Federalist Papers
described this mechanism in general terms, focusing primarily on its
political, rather than judicial aspects, they did acknowledge that judicial
2. Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3. These cases were ultimately decided by the Supreme Court sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4. Also called the "Minimum Essential Coverage" or "Personal Responsibility"
provision. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2010).
5.

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010).

6. I do not address here the courts' statutory jurisdiction to hear the Virginia case. Kevin
C. Walsh, The Ghost That Slew The Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55 (2012), contends that the
Declaratory Judgment Act did not authorize the court to hear the case.
7. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 605-07 (E.D. Va. 2010),
rev'd, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. 2012).
8. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 253.
9. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
10. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 269-70.
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resolution of such controversies would be necessary and appropriate.
Accordingly, the use of the courts to decide controversies over state and
federal power was quickly recognized as one of the best ways of
handling such disputes. One early precedent stands out as a particular
example of a state filing a lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of
what it contended as ultra vires federal action: McCulloch v.
Maryland," the classic 1819 case in which Maryland challenged the
constitutionality of the National Bank, and which established precedent
central to the PPACA litigation.
In this Article, I advance an argument in favor of recognizing state
standing to challenge ultra vires federal action. The Fourth Circuit's
decision was wrong: states should have the right to defend the sovereign
authority reserved to them in the Tenth Amendment. This authority
includes not only the power to regulate individuals and operate state
programs, but also the authority to articulate and defend individual
rights, at least where protection of those rights is not confined
exclusively to federal jurisdiction. Allowing states to protect their
authority would not, as the Fourth Circuit feared, cause a flood of
lawsuits. But states do have, as they ought to, an incentive to act in
defense of their sovereign authority. The federal government, by
contrast, can have no legitimate interest in barring states from
challenging ultra vires federal action. Recognizing state standing in
circumstances like those presented in Virginia is also prudent, since
without such an alternative, opposition to federal authority will likely
express itself in unconstitutional ways like "nullification." In short,
states should be able to challenge unconstitutional federal actions in
certain limited circumstances-namely, when the states have exercised
their authority, and federal interference constitutes a concrete and
particularized injury. The sovereignty reserved to states by the Tenth
Amendment is not limited to such matters as regulating the drinking age
or setting rules for hunting; states also have the constitutional power to
articulate and cast legal protection over the residuum of individual
rights-that is, those not exclusively entrusted to federal protection.
Ensuring that states can use courts to defend this sovereign power is one
important way to give meaning to the "double
protection" the founders
12
expected the Constitution to extend to all.

11.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

12.

THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 23

I. VIRGINIA'S CHALLENGE TO THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE

A. The VHCFA and the District Court Case
The national debate over PPACA was exceptionally heated,
particularly over the Individual Mandate, which requires every
American, except those under a certain income threshold or those living
abroad, to obtain health insurance that meets certain regulatory
specifications. 1 3 In reaction to this proposal, several states enacted
Health Care Freedom Acts-laws proclaiming that all persons have a
right not to purchase health insurance against their wills. The Virginia
Act provided that with certain limited exceptions "[n]o resident of this
Commonwealth... shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy of
individual insurance coverage."'
On March 23, 2010, the day PPACA was signed, Virginia Attorney
General Kenneth Cucinelli filed a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of PPACA. The complaint asked the district court "to
declare that [the Individual Mandate] is unconstitutional" because it
"exceeds the enumerated powers conferred upon Congress," and to
declare that the VHFCA "is a valid exercise of state power." 15 The only
plaintiff in the case was the state itself, and the short complaint asserted
that the Individual Mandate "imposes immediate and continuing
burdens on Virginia and its citizens" and that "[t]he collision between
the state and federal schemes also creates an immediate, actual
controversy involving antagonistic assertions of right." 16 Virginia
claimed its "interest in asserting the validity of its anti-mandate
enactment" as the sole injury it had suffered in the caselV-thus
differentiating the case from those brought by Florida and other states.
Plaintiffs in the Florida case, which challenged not only the Individual
Mandate, but also other provisions of the PPACA, included not only
several states, but also individual citizens. Because these individuals
the courts had little trouble
were directly affected by the Mandate,
8
dispensing with the standing inquiry.'
13. See generally Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580-82.
14. VA. CODEANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010).
15. Complaint at 6, Virginia v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (2011) (No. 3:10-cv-00188-HEH).
16. Id.at 2.
17. Id.at 3.
18. Florida ex rel. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1271-73
(N.D. Fla. 2011). The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida agreed with the
Virginia district court that states had standing to challenge the Individual Mandate as an
infringement of their Health Care Freedom Acts. See id. at 1272. The Eleventh Circuit
expressed discomfort with this holding, but decided that addressing the issue was unnecessary
because the individual citizens had standing to challenge the Mandate. Florida ex rel. Attorney
Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243-44 (11th Cir. 2011).
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The Obama Administration moved to dismiss, asserting that the state
lacked standing. The case was, it argued, a parenspatriae case in which
the state was seeking to act as a representative of individuals, rather
than on its own behalf as a sovereign-something prohibited by
longstanding precedent. But the state argued that it was acting on its
own behalf, seeking only to vindicate its sovereign authority to establish
a legal code. 19 The district court agreed. Likening the case to Wyoming
ex rel. Crank v. United States, in which a state was allowed to
challenge a federal law interfering with its authority to restore firearms
rights to people who expunged their criminal records, the court
concluded that "states have a legally protected sovereign interest in 'the
exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the
relevant jurisdiction,"' including "'the power to create and enforce a
legal code." ' 2 1 The district court later ruled in favor of the state on the
merits, declaring the Individual Mandate unconstitutional.22
B. The Fourth Circuit Vacates for Lack of Standing
On appeal before the Fourth Circuit, the question of standing took
center stage. The issue was the focus of extensive briefing and almost
the entire oral argument. When the three judge panel issued their
decision in September 2011, they unanimously declared that Virginia
23
lacked standing, and ordered the district court to vacate its ruling.
First, the Fourth Circuit declared, the state could not maintain a
parens patriae suit to vindicate the rights of Virginians against federal
authority.24 Quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon,25 the 1923 case in which
the Supreme Court declared that states may not sue the federal
government simply on behalf of individuals, it concluded that:
Virginia actually seeks to litigate as parens patriaeby asserting
the rights of its citizens .... [S]uch a claim would run afoul of
the prohibition against states suing the United States on behalf of
their citizens. This prohibition rests on the recognition that a state
possesses no legitimate interest in protecting its citizens from the
government of the United States. With respect to the federal
government's relationship to individual citizens, "it is the United
19.
20.
21.
(quoting
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Snapp, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 606-07 (E.D. Va. 2010)
Crank, 539 F.3d at 1242).
Id. at 788.
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 268-69.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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States, and not the state, which represents [citizens] as parens
patriae."When a state brings a suit seeking to protect individuals
from a federal statute, it usurps this sovereign prerogative of the
federal government and threatens the "general supremacy of
federal law." A state has no interest in the rights of its individual
citizens sufficient to justify such an invasion of federal
26
sovereignty.
The state would therefore need to assert some injury of its own in
order to maintain its case. Although Virginia pointed to the VHFCA as
an instance of the state creating and enforcing a legal code, this
argument was insufficient because it only recharacterized the rights of
the individual citizens, and it did not represent an independent injury to
the state as an entity. 27 The VHFCA did not "regulate[] behavior or
provide[] for the administration of a state program,"2 8 so infractions of
that law were not a harm to the state itself. The cases in which states
were found to have standing all involved laws that directly controlled
individuals or regulated state administrative proceedings; those laws
were 'exercise[s] of [a state's] sovereign power over individuals and
entities within the relevant jurisdiction.'"29 But the VHCFA "regulates
nothing and provides for the administration of no state program.
Instead, it simply purports to immunize Virginia citizens from federal
power, '31
law." 30 Since the VHCFA "reflects no exercise of 'sovereign
the state could not assert an injury to itself as a sovereign.
The court worried that recognizing state standing to challenge the
constitutionality of federal law in this way would allow them "to
challenge any federal law" with which they merely disagreed, "by
enacting a statute-even an utterly unenforceable one-purporting to
prohibit the application of the federal law." 32 A state might "enact a
statute declaring that 'no Virginia resident shall be required to pay
Social Security taxes' and proceed to file a lawsuit challenging the
Social Security Act." 33 This would make "each state" into "a roving
constitutional watchdog of sorts; no issue, no matter how generalized or
quintessentially4 political, would fall beyond a state's power to litigate in
federal court.",
26. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d at 268-69 (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486; Pennsylvania v.
Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
27. Id. at 269.
28.

Id.

29. Id. at 269-70.
30. Id. at 270.
31.

Id.

32. Id. at 271.
33.

Id.

34. Id. at 272.
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II. THE CREATIVE TENSION BETWEEN THE STATES AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

By barring states from seeking judicial resolution of conflicts
between federal and state laws, the Fourth Circuit's decision goes
further than the law of standing warrants, and does damage to the
scheme of dynamic federalism that the founding fathers designed to
preserve individual freedom. The ability of states to resist federal
overreaching in a lawful and orderly manner was a centerpiece of the
innovative political mechanism the Constitution's authors devised. The
Supreme Court unanimously declared only months before the PPACA
decision, "federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary
power. When government acts in excess of its lawful powers, that
liberty is at stake." 35 By restricting the ability of states to preserve their
sovereign authority, the Court of Appeals handicapped the federalist
structure.
A. The Theory of the Compound Republic

The Constitution divides power between states and the federal
government, not only to ensure a more effective administration, but to
protect individual rights. The Supreme Court has often remarked upon
this feature of federalism, 36 emphasizing that the framers specifically
expected the states and the federal government to operate in tension, in
a manner similar to the separation of powers and check-and-balance
structure built into the federal government itself. Congress, the Courts,
and the President, would each resist the others' encroachments, with the
power to block excessive acts of the other branches and to negotiate
with each other over controversies. In the same way, states would offset
federal power; while the federal government would enjoy only "few and
defined"-enumerated-powers,
the37states would retain authority over
,,
,
numerous and indefinite" subjects. Any effort by federal officials to
"extend [their] power beyond the due limits" would run into resistance
38
by state officials who would enjoy plentiful "means of opposition,"
including the people's "refusal to co-operate with the officers of the
Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; [and] the
embarrassments created by legislative devices." 39 These legislative
35. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
36. See id; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
38. Id. No. 46, at 319.
39. Id.
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devices would enable the "State Governments" to "easily defeat[]" any
"schemes of usurpation" that federal authorities might attempt.40 Thus
[i]n the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments
[state and federal], and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
other, at the same time that each
governments will control each
41
itself.
by
controlled
be
will
Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's fears, the founders counted on
states acting as "roving constitutional watchdogs" to prevent federal
abuses.42 In Federalist39, Madison anticipated that the federal judiciary
would be called upon at times to resolve such clashes:
[I]n controversies relating to the boundary between the two
jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide [i.e., the
Supreme Court], is to be established under the general
government. But ... [t]he decision is to be impartially made,
according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and
most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality.
Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the
sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be
established under the general rather than under the local
governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely
established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be
combated.43
The federal-state tension was at that time also strengthened by the
makeup of the Senate, which was chosen by state legislatures.
Accordingly, the Senate represented states as political units rather than
the people directly.
The first major test of the federal-state balance came with the crisis
over the Alien and Sedition Acts in the Adams Administration. Best
known for imposing heavy restrictions on freedom of speech, the Alien
and Sedition Acts were extreme expansions of federal-and especially
presidential-authority to detain and deport aliens and to punish
outspoken opposition to the Adams Administration policies. 44 Taking
40.

Id. at 322.

41.

Id.No. 51 at 351.

42.
43.

Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 272 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. No. 39 at 256.

44.

See generally DuMAs MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY 380-94
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up leadership of the opposition, Vice President Thomas Jefferson and
Congressman James Madison secretly prepared the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions to oppose these laws as unconstitutional.45 But the
Resolutions-particularly the Kentucky Resolutions, written by
Jefferson-went beyond merely arguing that the Acts were unwise.
They announced that states had the unilateral authority to declare a
federal law null and void, and to refuse it any legal effect. 46 This served
as the basis for the theory of "nullification," advanced by South
Carolina leaders in the 1830s, and ultimately as the basis of secession. 47
As described below, the nullification theory rests on a faulty
understanding of the Constitution, and Madison, whose Virginia
Resolutions were far less militant in this regard, repudiated the idea of
nullification. He explained in his Report of 1800 that the Resolutions
had meant only to pronounce laws unconstitutional as "expressions of
opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may
produce on opinion, by exciting reflection. 4 8 Madison spent his
retirement
years
explaining
why actual
nullification
is
unconstitutional,49 insisting that the Resolutions were not an effort at
nullification. However that may be, the experiences in Kentucky and
Virginia were among the earliest examples of popular resistance to
perceived unconstitutionality by the federal government. It was natural
that expressions of discontent came from the states. "[T]he relation of
the state legislatures to the federal legislature," as Madison observed,
made it proper for them to resist violations of the Constitution. 50 When
the Constitution was first proposed, its supporters answered fears of
federal usurpation by reminding Americans that the states would stand
"vigilantt]" to "descry the first symptoms of usurpation" and "sound the
alarm." 5 Doing so was entirely compatible with judicial resolution of
clashes between the federal and state governments. Indeed, Madison
recognized that states should resort to the courts to settle disputes over
(1962).
45. Jefferson and Madison acted in secret because authoring the Resolutions was itself
probably a criminal act under the Sedition Law. Id. at 400.
46. THOMAS JEFFERSON, DRAFT OF THE KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS (1798) [hereinafter
JEFFERSON, KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS], reprinted in JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 449-56 (M. Peterson
ed., 1984).
47. See generally DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 77 (2003); WILLIAM
FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA

177-260 (1992).
48. JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1800) [hereinafter
MADISON, REPORT], reprintedin MADISON: WRITINGS 659 (J. Rakove ed., 1999).
49. See generally DREw R. McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
REPUBLICAN LEGACY 119-70 (1989).
50. MADISON, REPORT, supra note 48, at 660.
51. Id.at661.
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52
"the boundary of jurisdiction between the Federal & the State Govts."
Whenever the states and the federal government clash over their
respective authority, he wrote, "there is & must be an Arbiter or Umpire
in the constitutional authority provided for deciding questions
concerning the boundaries of right & power. The particular provision, in
the Constitution of the U.S. is in the authority of the Supreme Court, as
stated in the 'Federalist,' No. 39.,,53 Of course the Court could decide
wrongly, but in such a case, "the final resort within the purview of the
Constn. lies in an amendment of the Constn. according to a process
applicable by the States."54
Ever since the Alien and Sedition Law Crisis, states have often taken
seriously what Akhil Amar calls their "special role and responsibility in
protecting their constituents from federal lawlessness. 55 That role has
often been invisible, taking the form of Congressional consideration of
state authority in its own deliberations or at the behest of lobbying
groups. 56 This inward negotiation was particularly acute at a time when
Senators were elected by state legislatures, and thus represented the
states as corporate entities more clearly than they do now. 57 But states
have also resorted to court to challenge perceived intrusions into realms
reserved to the states. Throughout the nineteenth century, states
to conflict with federal
occasionally adopted laws consciously designed
58
laws so as to test constitutionality in court.
In Worcester v. Georgia,59 for example, the state enacted a law
requiring licenses for missionaries to the Cherokee, in order to provoke
a conflict between federal and state sovereignty that would allow for
judicial resolution of the case. 60 More notable were the Personal Liberty

52. James Madison, Letter to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830) [hereinafter Letter to
Everett], reprintedin MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 48, at 846.
53. James Madison, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Sept. 7, 1829), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON: 1819-1836 at 351 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
54. Letter to Everett, reprinted in MADISON: WRITINGS, supra note 48 at 847.
55. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1517 (1987).
States have, however, often colluded in the eradication of their own autonomy. See generally
MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 67-68 (2012).
56. John Dinan, Contemporary Assertions of State Sovereignty and the Safeguards of
American Federalism, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1637, 1639-40 (2011).
57. See generallyTodd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell andHusk of History: The History of
The Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implicationsfor Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 165, 169-72 (1997); Roger G. Brooks, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the
Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189, 196-208
(1987).
58. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 420-21
(1995).
59. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
60. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 412 (2007). The Marshall
Court had repeatedly declined to exercise jurisdiction in cases arising from Georgia's conflict
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Laws northern states enacted in defiance of federal legislation
protecting slavery. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,6 1 the Supreme Court held
these to be unconstitutional as conflicting with federal authority, but
states continued to adopt them.62 These cases did not address questions
of state standing to challenge federal legislation, but they do indicate the
vital role that courts have always played in resolving questions of state
and federal power. As Chief Justice Roger Taney remarked, the federal
judiciary was created in part to "prevent an appeal to the sword and a
dissolution of the 63compact" in cases where the states and the federal
government clash:
[W]here two separate governments exercise certain powers of
sovereignty over the same territory, each independent of the other
within its appropriate sphere of action . . . there was . . . an
absolute necessity, in order to preserve internal tranquillity, that
there should be some tribunal to decide between the Government
of the United States and the government of a State whenever any
controversy should arise as to their relative and respective powers
Supreme Court was created for that
in the common
64 territory. The
....
purpose
While scholars today debate whether federalism is better
safeguarded through the political or the judicial process, 65 it is at least
clear that the Constitution's framers did not consider it improper for
courts to resolve such questions. While the framers believed procedural
with the Cherokee. As Howe explains, the state employed Worcester as a test case to force the
Court to act.
61. Priggv. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
62. James Oliver Horton & Lois E. Horton, A FederalAssault: African-Americans and
the Impact of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1179, 1185 (1993).
63. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. Appx. 697, 700-702 (1865). According to an
editor's note, Chief Justice Taney's opinion was originally misplaced, and the Court issued a
short decision in the case at 69 U.S. 561 (1864). After being found, the draft opinion was then
published as an historical curiosity in 1885, in the 117th volume of the United States Reports.
See id. at 697-98. One hesitates, of course, to cite Chief Justice Taney's opinions. Given his
decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), he brings to mind Lon Fuller's comment
that it sometimes makes sense to say that one judge makes worse law than another. LON FULLER,
ANATOMY OF LAW 146 (New York: Mentor, 1969) (1968). Indeed, as Charles Sumner said, "the
name of Taney is to be hooted down the page of history .... He administered justice wickedly,
and degraded the judiciary of the country, and... the age." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 2d Sess.
1012 (1865). Nevertheless, his observation in Gordon withstands scrutiny: the federal courts
police the boundaries between the state and federal governments and were made independent of
state authority in large part for that very reason. See id.
64. Gordon, 117 U.S. at700-01.
65. See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-BasedFederalism Theories, 79 TEx. L. REv. 1459 (2001); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A.
Young, Federalismand the Double Standardof JudicialReview, 51 DuKE L.J. 75 (2001).
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safeguards would in general be more effective, they did not deny that
states should have the right to defend their autonomy in court when
proper.
B. "Nullification"
Before proceeding, it would be best to address one common
misconception. Since its passage, the VHCFA has often been
mischaracterized as an effort at nullification. 66 It is worthwhile to
explain why this is a misrepresentation, 67 particularly given the fact that
similar bills in other states were explicit attempts to nullify the PPACA.
The theory of "nullification," first suggested by Jefferson in his
Kentucky Resolutions and embraced by southern politicians beginning
in the 1830s, 68 rests on a fundamental misconception about the
Constitution. The theory's basic premise is that the federal union is a
league of sovereign states, not unlike a treaty, in which each state
exercises at its own discretion a sovereign power to absolve citizens of
their obligation to comply with a federal law. According to this
"compact" theory of the Constitution, "each State acceded" to the
69
Constitution "as a State, and is an integral party" of the federal union.
In its extreme form, this theory holds that the federal union is not
sovereign at all, but is instead more like the United Nations, an
organization "ordained and established by the several States, as distinct,
sovereign communities.'70 Under the Constitution, argued John C.
Calhoun, sovereignty does not reside in "the people, taken in the
aggregate, as forming one community or nation," but in the states "as
separate and distinct communities.' '71 Naturally, if the states are joined
together into a league of sovereign communities, those sovereignties
retain the power to resist foreign or federal interference with their
sovereignty: "a State not only has the right, but is, in duty to itself and
66.

See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Can the States Nullify Health Care Reform?, 362 NEW

ENG. J. MED. 869, 869 (2010); Barak Y. Orbach et al., Arming States' Rights: Federalism,
Private Lawmakers, and the Battering Ram Strategy, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1161, 1197 (2011);
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-Based Dissent to Federal
Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 112-13 (2010).

67. See further Dinan, supra note 56, at 1639-40 ("contrary to the statements of
supporters and critics alike . ..recent state measures regarding health care, guns, driver's
licenses, and medicinal marijuana fall short of invoking the clearly discredited doctrine of
nullification .... Rather ... these recent state measures illustrate several ways that states are
capable of safeguarding federalism principles without engaging in nullification.").
68.

See generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION

CONTROVERSY INSOUTH CAROLINA, 1816-1836 (1992).
69. JEFFERSON, KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS, supra note 46, at 449.
70. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1851), reprintedin UNION AND LIBERTY 94 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992).
71. Id.at 100-01.
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the Union, bound to interpose ... and to prevent the powers reserved to
72
itself, from being absorbed by those delegated to the United States.,
Of course, if a state retained such sovereign authority, then it would also
follow that a state could secede from the union, just as a nation can
withdraw from an international compact.
The main problem with this theory is that the Constitution was
designed expressly to abolish the model of a league of sovereign states
and to replace it with a single, central government deriving its power
directly from the national sovereign. The essential flaw in the Articles
of Confederation, according to the framers, was that it was a league of
states.73 By contrast, the new Constitution would form a more perfect
union by erecting a radical new theory of sovereignty under which the
nation-the aggregate of the people as a single community-would be
sovereign for certain specified purposes. 74 Under it, the federal
government derives its authority not from the several states, but from
the sovereign people of the United States-the "We, the people" to
which the preamble refers.75 When Patrick Henry challenged James
Madison on this point at the Richmond ratification conventiondemanding to know "who authorised [the Constitutional Convention] to
speak the language of We the People, instead of We, the States?" 76
Madison patiently answered that whereas under the Articles, Congress
had "derived" its power "from the dependent derivative authority of the
legislatures of the states," the new federal government "derived" its

72. Id. at 198.
73. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 93 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The great and
radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of
LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist."); id.
No. 22, at 145-46 (Alexander Hamilton).
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system,
that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation
than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and
intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some
instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal.
Id.
74.

See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 3-53

(2005).
75. See, e.g., McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403-05 (1819) (federal sovereignty
"proceeds directly from the people ....
[The Constitution] required not the affirmance, and
could not be negatived, by the state governments ....
The government of the Union, then ... is,
emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance, it emanates from
them.").
76. 2 BERNARD BAILYN, DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: JANUARY TO AUGUST 1788, at
596 (1993).
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power "from the superior power of the people." 77 Because the federal
union is established by a single sovereignty, the Constitution is not
analogous to a treaty organization; the states play no intermediary role
at all between the people and the federal government. 78 The federal
government imposes its laws directly on the people and derives its
legitimacy directly from them. Nullification presumes that states play a
role in the national sovereignty, which they do not play.
This unity, however, exists only with regard to those matters
entrusted to the federal government; for the Constitution only
"constitute[s] the people thereof one people for certain purposes." 79 The
federal government enjoys only limited, enumerated powers, and what
is not enumerated is reserved to the States. As Chief Justice Marshall
observed, "the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action."80 On matters outside that sphere of
action, the states remain autonomous, and on those matters state
governments are the ultimate authority. As Justice Anthony Kennedy
put it, the federal system of dual sovereignty establishes "two orders of
government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and
are governed by it." 1 Thus while "States may not invade the sphere of
federal sovereignty," so too, "the Federal Government must be held
within the boundaries of
82 its own power when it intrudes upon matters
reserved to the States."
Although opponents of nullification, from Madison 83 to Daniel
Webster 84 explained these problems with the theory, southern leaders
put it to the test in the 1830s in response to the "Tariff of
Abominations," a federal duty on imports that raised the cost of
manufactured goods-manufactured primarily in northern states-but
provided no protection to domestic agriculture, which was located in the
south. 85 In 1832, the South Carolina legislature issued an Ordinance of
Nullification, pronouncing the tariff to be null and void.8 6 The Jackson
77.

Id.at 619.

78.

See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

79. Letter to Everett, in MADISION: WRITINGS, supra note 48, at 843.
80. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added).
81. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
82. Id. at 841.
83. Madison's involvement in the drafting of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions led
to significant embarrassment when, in his retirement, he found himself opposing nullification.
See generally MCCOY, supra note 49.
84. See generally THE WEBSTER-HAYNE DEBATE ON THE NATURE OF THE UNION (Herman

Belz ed., 2000).
85.

DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT 274-75, 395-410 (2007).

86.

Id. at 404.
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Administration responded by threatening military intervention, and a
settlement was negotiated: the state repealed its ordinance but at the
same time issued a new ordinance declaring any such military
intervention also to be nullified.87 But this compromise meant that the
theory of nullification remained popular in southern intellectual circles,
and laid the foundation for the theory of secession three decades later.
Nullification experienced a small resurgence in the Civil Rihts era,
when states resorted to it as a tool to oppose desegregation. Even
today, long after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 89 the
theory of nullification remains popular in some circles, 90 and some
opponents of the Individual Mandate did call loudly for state
legislatures to nullify it. 9 1 In 2011, the Idaho legislature considered a
bill, H.B. 117,92 which would have declared that "[t]he Legislature of
the state of Idaho ...hereby asserts its legitimate authority to interpose
between [its] citizens and the federal government, when it has exceeded
its constitutional authority and declares that the state shall not
participate in and considers void and of no effect the PPACA." That bill
was killed in committee, 93 but Oklahoma and Arizona have
contemplated similar bills. 94 An organization called the Tenth
Amendment Center even provided on its website a model "Federal
Health Care Nullification Act," which would pronounce that the
PPACA "invalid in this state, shall not be recognized by this state, is
specifically rejected by this state, and shall be considered null and void
87.

See HOWE, supra note 60, at 395-410.

88. Perhaps the most devastating judicial pronouncement on the subject is to be found in
Bush v. Orleans ParishSch. Bd, 188 F. Supp. 916, 923-27 (E.D. La. 1960), aff'd 365 U.S. 569
(1961) (per curiam), where the court characterized a nullifications statute as a kind of nonbinding resolution or a way of blowing off steam.
89. The Fourteenth Amendment was meant to put an end to the compact theory of the
Constitution. See Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process, 5
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 115, 14142 (2010).
90. See, e.g., THOMAS E. WOODS JR., NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY
INTHE 21ST CENTURY (2010).
91. See, e.g., Toothless Nullification, LIBERTY LEGAL FOUNDATION, http://libertylegal
foundation.org/ 117 l/toothless-nullification/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (favoring nullification to
oppose the Individual Mandate); Larry Greenley, States Should Nullify the Entire
ObamaCareLaw, JOHN BIRCH SOC'Y (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.jbs.org/commentary/statesshould-nullify-the-entire-obamacare-law (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
92. An Act Relating to State Sovereignty, Health and Safety, H.R. 117, 2011 Sess. (Idaho
2011), http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/201 /HO117.pdf.
93. Betsy Z. Russell, Idaho Panel Kills Nullification Bill, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Feb. 26,
2011), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/201 1/feb/26/idaho-panel-kills-nullification-billI.
94. See Rep. Mike Ritze says Oklahoma Could Nullify Obamacare, TULSA BEACON (July
19, 2012). The Oklahoma proposal, HB 1276, was passed through the state's House Judiciary
Committee, but was not allowed to go to the floor. The Arizona initiative, called the "Arizona
Federal Action Rejection Initiative," had not qualified for the ballot at the time this Article went
to press.
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95
and of no effect in this state."
But unlike these measures, the VHFCA did not purport to absolve
Virginians of their obligation to comply with federal law, or even to
pronounce on the constitutionality of the Individual Mandate. Instead, it
declared that "[n]o resident of this Commonwealth ... shall be required
9
to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage." This
language simply recognizes and articulates an individual right, and
promises to exercise state authority consistently with such a right. Had
PPACA not been enacted, the state would have been within its rights to
enact this legislation because nothing in the Constitution precludes it
from exercising the police power in this way, and the Tenth
Amendment therefore reserves such authority to the state. Obviously, if
the VHFCA conflicts with valid federal legislation, it would have to
yield, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.
Nor did the VHCFA attempt to subvert the dual sovereignty
structure of the Constitution. Most notably, it made no mention of
"states' rights" or any sovereign authority to declare federal laws
unconstitutional; it simply recognized and defined an individual right,
one which is not conferred exclusively to federal protection. While
nullification is premised on a rejection of the dual sovereignty nature of
the Constitution-presuming that the state possesses authority to
intercede between the citizen and the federal government-the VHCFA
implicitly accepted the traditional federalist structure, making no effort
to step outside it. Nullification has always drawn much of its appeal
from the view that federal courts cannot be trusted fairly to adjudicate
97
questions regarding the boundary between state and federal power, a
concern that Madison anticipated in Federalist 39 when he wrote that
disputes between the states and the federal government over their
respective powers would have to be resolved by federal courts. Political
actors who do not believe federal courts will decide such questions
fairly have tried to resort to nullification instead. But the VHCFA was
not devised as a means of escaping federal courts. 98 On the contrary, the
state enacted the law to recognize explicitly the right not to be forced to
buy health insurance and to cast state policy in that form, thereby
sharpening the case for judicial resolution. The state then submitted
itself to federal jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over federal power

95. Federal Health Care Nullification Act, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR., http://tenth
(last visited Sept. 24,
amendmentcenter.com/legislation/federal-health-care-nullification-act/
2012).
96. VA. CODEANN. § 38.2-3430.1:1 (2010).
97. See, e.g., WOODS, supranote 90, at 6.
98. See generally Matthew R. Farley, Challenging Supremacy: Virginia's Response to
The PatientProtectionand Affordable CareAct, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 37 (2010) (explaining the

history of the VHFCA).
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within the constitutional structure. The VHCFA is simply not a
nullification statute.
III. STATES CAN DEFEND THEIR SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY IN
FEDERAL COURT

A. States Enjoy Sovereign Power to ProtectIndividualRights Not
Already Vested Wholly in FederalGovernment
The Tenth Amendment emphasizes that the states retain whatever
authority is not confided to the federal government, or prohibited to the
states. This is an indefinite mass of power, which Madison described as
"extend[ing] to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."9 9 It is not possible to
identify all of these powers; where the federal government exercises
only those powers specified in the Constitution or implied by those
specifications, the states retain authority over the "variety of more
minute interests" affecting everyday life.1° ° This is the "police power,"
which is "not susceptible of definition with circumstantial precision,"
but
springs from the obligation of the State to protect its citizens and
provide for the safety and good order of society . . . .It is the
governmental power of self protection, and permits reasonable
regulation of rights and property in particulars essential to the
preservation of the community from injury. 101
This police power is limited, of course, by, the Fourteenth
Amendment and other restrictions on state power.' 0 But within those
boundaries, that authority is qualitatively the same as that enjoyed by a
foreign nation, and includes "not only the right, but the bounden and
03
solemn duty" to protect the public health, safety, and welfare.1
The residual sovereignty that states enjoy obviously includes such
powers as laying and collecting taxes, and regulating alcohol
consumption, or hunting, or the disposal of waste, or the operation of
99. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (James Madison).
100. Id.No. 17 at 107 (Alexander Hamilton).
101. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n of Kansas, 294 U.S. 613, 622
(1935) (citing New York & N.E.R. Co. v. Town of Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894)).
102. Id.at 619. See also Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or,
The Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 326-28 (2012) (explaining how
due process can also serve as a limit on state power).
103. Mayor ofNew York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 139 (1837).
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state elections. What makes these examples relevant is that the Supreme
Court has allowed states to bring lawsuits against the federal
government to challenge federal interference with each of these powers.
In McCulloch v. Maryland,10 4 discussed in more detail below, the state
was allowed to sue to vindicate its power to tax. In South Dakota v.
Dole, 0 5 the state challenged federal interference with its authority to set
the state drinking age. In Missouri v. Holland, the Court found that the
state had standing to challenge federal interference with its authority to
regulate hunting.' ° 6 In New York v. United States, 0 7 the state was
permitted to challenge a federal law that interfered with its power to
regulate the disposal of toxic waste. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 08 the state
was allowed to challenge federal laws that interfered with the state's
power to regulate elections.
Federal courts have long recognized that states have standing to
challenge the constitutionality of federal laws that interfere with their
sovereign authority to implement a legal code. In Alfred L. Snapp & Son
v. Puerto Rico,1 09 the Court ruled that Puerto Rico had standing to sue
certain employers for failing to comply with federal employment and
immigration laws. That case explicitly involved parens patriae
standing, and thus is not directly applicable to a case like the Virginia
litigation, where the state asserted only an injury to its sovereignty. But
Snapp did recognize that states have an interest, qualitatively distinct
from the interests of citizens, in exercising power over individuals and
entities within its jurisdiction, including-but not limited to-the power
to create and enforce a legal code.
Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States" ° involved no element of
parenspatriae standing; there, the state sued the federal government for
interfering with this sovereign authority. The state enacted a law
governing how misdemeanor convictions would be expunged from a
person's record for purposes of restoring the right to possess firearms.
Federal officials contended that this statute conflicted with federal law,
and the state's Attorney General filed suit, seeking declaratory relief to
determine the validity of the statute. The court found that Wyoming had
standing because "states have a legally protected sovereign interest in
'the exercise of sovereign power over individuals and entities within the
104. McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 316-45 (1819).
105. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
106. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Indeed, Holland went out of its way to
note that the state was asserting an injury to its "sovereign[ty]" because the federal law at issue
would "contravene [the state's] statutes." Id. at 43 1.
107. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
108. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 (1970).
109. Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
110. Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
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relevant jurisdiction[, which] involves the power to create and enforce a
legal code.' Federal regulatory action that preempts State law creates a
sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy this prong.""' Under the Tenth
Amendment, Wyoming retained power to set its own rules regarding the
restoration of rights following conviction of State law crimes; thus the
federal regulation intruding on that power inflicted a judicially
cognizable injury.
In State ofAlaska v. Department of Transportation,'12 the court held
that Alaska and twenty-six other States had standing to seek declaratory
relief when the federal government claimed certain State laws
governing airline advertising were preempted by federal law.1" 3 The
court took care to distinguish this sovereign interest from parenspatriae
standing: the States had an independent "sovereign interest in law
enforcement" over and1 14above the interests of citizens, and had standing
to defend that interest.'
In Castillo v. Cameron Co., the Fifth Circuit ruled that Texas had
standing to appeal a court order governing prisons, despite the fact that
15
the order had been issued in a lawsuit brought by individual inmates.'
The State had a judicially cognizable stake in the case "even though [it]
is not required to perform or refrain from performing any particular
acts" by the terms of the challenged order. 1 6 This was because the order
allowed the sheriff "in violation of State law, to refuse to incarcerate"
persons convicted of crimes.1 1 7 This intruded on the State's sovereign
authority to enact and enforce its legal code and thus inflicted an
Article III injury. In Pennsylvania v. Porter,'' the Third Circuit held
that states have "significant sovereign interests of [their] own in the
prevention of future violations of constitutional rights of [their]
citizens." This was not aparenspatriaeinterest because the state had its
own "vital[] interest[] in safeguarding the health and safety of
individuals in its territory."11 9 The state's power to protect citizens
against unauthorized government actions was "no different in kind"
from the state's interest in addressing pollution or products liability
issues. 120
A state's sovereign authority to enact and enforce a legal code is
111.
112.

Id. at 1242 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601).
State of Alaska v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 868 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

113.

See id. at 444.

114.
115.
116.

See id. at 443 n.1.
Castillo v. Cameron Co., 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2001).
Id.at 350.

117.
118.
(1982).
119.
120.

Id. at350-51.
Pennsylvania v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
Id. at315.
Id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 23

broad and indefinite, since it encompasses the full mass of power
reserved under the Tenth Amendment. That authority is conceptually
distinct from the particular interests of the state's citizens. The state as a
sovereign is harmed when this authority is infringed, and that injury is
qualitatively different from any injury experienced by an individual
citizen. An injury to the state's authority to enact and enforce a legal
code is judicially cognizable, and the state may sue in federal court to
redress such an injury.
B. Not Limited to "ImplementingPrograms"
The power reserved to the states includes not only regulatory power,
but the general power to articulate and to defend individual rights.
States have a sovereign interest in "defining the laws or rules that
govern society, seeing that those laws and rules are obeyed, and
punishing those who transgress them. This enforcement interest is a
quintessential aspect of sovereignty."' 12 1 One of the long-recognized
elements of sovereignty is the power to make declarations or
pronouncements that describe what rights the state recognizes and
promises to protect. Sovereigns, wrote William Blackstone, have a
fundamental interest in "guard[ing] the rights of each individual
member."' 122 For John Locke, the "Legislative Power" was "that, which
has a right to direct how the Force of the Commonwealth shall be
of it." 123
employed for preserving the Community and the Members
is arguably
Indeed, the articulation and protection of individual rights
24
law.'
American
in
sovereignty
of
basis
legitimate
the only
States regularly use their power to describe and protect individual
rights more broadly than the federal Constitution does; the Supreme
Court has described this as the state's "sovereign right to adopt in its
own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
' ' 125 These enactments are
conferred by the Federal Constitution.
sometimes little more than declaratory, yet that does not make them any
121. Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:Allocating Cases Between
Federaland State Courts, 104 COLuM. L. REV. 1211, 1242 (2004).
122. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, at *48.

123. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 143 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1963).
124. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1 Stat. 1 (1776) ("to secure these rights,
governments are instituted among men . . . ."); 5 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, ED., BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES App. 14 (1803) ("when the constitution is founded in voluntary compact, and
consent, and imposes limits to the efficient force of the government, or administrative authority,
the people are still the sovereign; the government is the mere creature of their will; and those
who administer it are their agents and servants.").
125. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). See also Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
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less an exercise of sovereign power. The founders saw the Bill of Rights
itself as largely declaratory.126 In short, a sovereign may exercise its
lawmaking power not only in the form of command-style exercises of
authority, but it may also make declarations of state policy and promises
of protection for individual rights. 127 California, for example, amended
its Constitution in 1976 to declare that "[r]ights guaranteed by this
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution."' 128 Or, to take another example, California, 129 Arizona, 3 0
and other states have enacted constitutional amendments or legislation
providing that marriages may exist only between a man and a woman.
These announcements of general policy and legal validity are certainly
exercises of the legal authority reserved to states under the Tenth
Amendment, 131 even though they implement programs or regulate
individual behavior only indirectly, if at all.
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized in the Virginia case that
states do have standing to sue in defense of their power to implement a
legal code, the court distinguished those precedents on the grounds that
the laws involved in those cases "regulated behavior or provided for the
administration of a state program," whereas the VHCFA "regulates
' 32
nothing and provides for the administration of no state program."'
126. See, e.g., James Madison, Speech Introducing Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), in
MADISON: WRITINGS 446-47 (J. Rakove ed., 1999) ("as [bills of rights] have a tendency to
impress some degree of respect for [rights], to establish the public opinion in their favor, and
rouse the attention of the whole community, [they] may be one means to controul the

[government].").
127. The Health Care Freedom Act may not administer state programs, but it does bar the
state from implementing certain types of programs. For example, the PPACA relies in part on
states establishing "exchanges" for the sale of required insurance policies. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.
5000A(e)(ii). States are free to decide whether to establish exchanges, however. See 42 U.S.C. §
18041. Depending on the wording of a state's Health Care Freedom Act, it may be a violation of
state law for officials to establish and exchange. For example, Arizona's Health Care Freedom
Act, Ariz. Const. art. XXVII § 2, prohibits the state from adopting any "law or rule" which shall
"compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer or health care provider to
participate in
any health care system." This provision bars the state from implementing an exchange even
though it does not control individual behavior or implement a state program.
128. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
129. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.

130.
131.

ARiz. CONST. art. XXX, § 1.
Cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 206 (J. Cooke ed., 1961).
Suppose by some forced constructions of its authority (which indeed cannot
easily be imagined) the Federal Legislature should attempt to vary the law of
[inheritance] in any State; would it not be evident that in making such an
attempt it had exceeded its jurisdiction and infringed upon that of the State?

Id.
132.

Commonwealth of Va. v. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d 253,269-70 (4th Cir. 2011).
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Thus states only have a judicially cognizable interest in creating and
enforcing a code that administers a state program or controls individual
behavior. But this novel distinction cannot be supported either by
precedent or by the principles of federalism.
No court has ever held that the only "legal code" interests states may
assert are those that administer state programs or regulate individuals.
On the contrary, in Snapp itself, the Supreme Court recognized that
states' sovereign interests include the demand for recognition from
other sovereigns and the maintenance of their borders, neither of which
of persons.133
involves the administration of programs or regulation
Courts have also recognized such sovereign state interests as defining
their jurisdiction;' 3 4 setting their own legislative agendas without
interference; 135 and defining state property law. 136 Other sovereign
interests include the power to "govern family relationships ... settl[e]
the estates within [their] jurisdiction ...[as well as] probate, trusts,
estates, and property law .. .[all of which involve functions which
make our states self-governing sovereigns."' ' None of these involves
administering state programs. The Supreme Court has also held that
states have standing to appeal judgments holding their statutes
unconstitutional, not because the statutes involved were directly
concerned with the administration of state programs, but because states
have a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of their own
138
laws. 1 By creating a new limit to the standing analysis, whereby states
may only seek to vindicate their autonomy when they are administering
took a
programs or regulating individuals, the Fourth Circuit's decision
39
cramped view of the role of states in the federalist scheme.'
In a recent article supporting the Fourth Circuit's decision, Professor
Stephen Vladeck argues that the Constitution only allows a state to sue
the federal government when it can identify "a unique federal
to defend. 140
constitutional interest" that it possesses, and that it seeks
But states have a unique federal constitutional interest in the
preservation of all of the powers reserved to them under the Tenth
Amendment-which is the broad, indefinite authority left over after the
enumeration of federal powers. To require states to identify something
more specific than that risks turning the federal scheme on its head, and
133.

Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).

134.
135.

See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 854, 870 (2010).
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 779 (1982).

136. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998).
137. Sconiers v. Whitmore, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101962, 15-16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24,
2008) (citing Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 396 F.3d 348, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2005)).
138.

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986).

139.

See Harper,396 F.3d at 352-57.

140.
(2012).

Stephen I. Vladeck, States' Rights and State Standing, 46 U. RiCH. L. REV.845, 870
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giving the federal government indefinite power while reducing states to
a narrow range of powers which the federal government might choose
to give them. Vladeck argues, for example, that the Wyoming case was
rightly decided because the state was "specifically authorized" to sue by
a federal statute. 14 1 Yet to allow states to sue the federal government
only where Congress allows such suits would invert the constitutional
"first principle[]' 142 of limited, enumerated powers, and make it into a
type of sovereign immunity that shields from legal challenge all federal
intrusion on state autonomy. The Constitution does not confine states to
a list of specified powers; nor should the states' power to seek court
resolution be limited in such a way.
C. McCulloch v. Maryland: The State Challenges Ultra Vires
FederalAction
In deciding whether Virginia had standing to sue the federal
government for what it considered federal ultra vires acts, one case
stood out as an obvious precedent, only to be ignored by the Court of
Appeals: McCulloch v. Maryland.143 McCulloch is a particularly apt
precedent because the legal issues involved in it are remarkably similar
to the litigation over the Individual Mandate.
The National Bank controversy began when President Washington
signed the Bank's enabling legislation over the objections of Jefferson
and Madison. 144 They contended that Congress lacked authority to
create a bank, and that the Bank's supporters-primarily Treasury
Secretary Alexander Hamilton-were resorting to constitutional
arguments that would expand the federal government far beyond its
enumerated powers. 145 Hamilton, for his part, argued that Congress had
authority not only to regulate commerce and lay and collect taxes, but to
make whatever laws it considered necessary and proper to effectuate
these powers-a loose standard, in Jefferson's eyes.
No legal challenge was mounted against the first National Bank, but
in 1816, President Madison, having reconciled himself to its
constitutionality, signed a bill to charter a second bank. Opposition
persisted, and in response to the rechartering, several states enacted
laws to confront the Bank directly, by taxing its operations or
prohibiting it outright. 146 Among these was Maryland, which in 1818
141.
142.
143.

Id.at 869.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

144.

See generally MARK R. KILLENBECK, M'CULLOCH V. MARYLAND: SECURING A

(2006).
145. Id.
146. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME

NATION

COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 505-06 (1922)
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passed a law to tax all banks not chartered by the legislature-of which
there was only one: the Second Bank of the United States. 147 The statute
required the Bank to pay specified sums to the Treasurer of the Western
Shore, on penalty of $500 for each offense; a qui tam provision allowed
any person suing to enforce the penalty to keep half of any penalty
recovered. 148 When James McCulloch, president of the Baltimore
branch of the Bank, refused to pay, the Treasurer of the Western Shore,
an official named John James filed an enforcement suit. 149 The case was
filed in state court, which ruled for the plaintiff, and that decision was
affirmed on appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court took the case. The
Maryland tax law was passed specifically to provoke a clash between
the state's sovereign authority to impose taxes on businesses and the
federal government's asserted sovereign authority to establish the
' 50 Bank:
to, in Daniel Webster's words, "expel the bank from the state.'
Of course, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
National Bank and held that the Supremacy Clause barred the state from
taxing it. 151 But nobody denied that the state had standing to sue. On the
contrary, Chief Justice Marshall allowed the case to proceed to the
merits, while acknowledging that the plaintiff was a sovereign state
purporting to exercise its sovereign authority. 152 Nor does it appear that
any subsequent case law or scholarly writing has ever so much as
suggested that Maryland lacked standing to challenge the national bank
by filing a lawsuit. True, modem standing doctrine had not been
developed in 1819, but Marshall was never shy about dismissing cases
on jurisdictional grounds, 153 and neither he nor the parties suggested
there was any impropriety in Maryland's suit to enforce a tax enacted
for the purpose of provoking a test case.
It is hard to see how the Maryland tax differs from the VHCFA or
how McCulloch differs from the Virginia challenge to the Individual
Mandate. 154 In both cases, the federal government claimed authority
(noting that the Maryland bank tax was passed to provoke a legal challenge to the bank);
KILLENBECK, supra note 144, at 68-89.

147.

THOMAS MCAFFEE, POWERS RESERVED FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY

OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 89 (2006).
148. KILLENBECK, supra note 144, at 68, 69.

149. In fact, his name appears to have been James M'Culloh. See id. at 90.
150. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 329 (1819) (argument of Mr. Webster). See
also id.at 338-39 (argument of Mr. Hopkinson) ("The right now assailed by the bank, is the
right of taxing property within the territory of [the State]. This is the highest attribute of
sovereignty; the right to raise revenue ....
151. Id. at436.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. 1 (1831).
154. See also Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II et al., State Sovereign Standing: Often Overlooked,
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under the necessary and proper and commerce clauses to pass
legislation. In both cases, states enacted statutes to create the
opportunity for judicial resolution of the controversy between the state
and federal governments; in both cases, the states resorted to the federal
courts to determine the constitutional question. The Maryland statute
imposed a business tax-one of the unspecified sovereign powers
reserved to states under the Tenth Amendment-while the Virginia
statute asserted and guaranteed an individual right, which is also a
sovereign power reserved by the Tenth Amendment. Certainly it is hard
to reconcile McCulloch with the Fourth Circuit's fear that recognizing
Virginia's standing to sue would lead to the intolerable consequence
that "a state could acquire standing to challenge any federal law merely
by enacting a statute .. purporting to prohibit the application of the
federal law,"' 155 since under the older decision, Virginia would
undeniably have acquired standing simply by imposing, say, a $5 tax on
any Virginian purchasing health insurance in compliance with the
PPACA.
IV. MASSACHUSETTS V. MELLON AND STATE PARENS
PATRIAE STANDING

The question of whether states may challenge ultra vires federal
action is complicated by the Supreme Court's precedent in
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 15upon which the Fourth Circuit relied to
declare the Virginia litigation a forbidden parens patriae case. As we
have seen, the Virginia case was not a parens patriae case, but a case
brought to vindicate the state's independent interests. But assuming that
the case can be characterized as a parens patriae action, the courts
should still have authority to review the constitutionality of a law like
the VHCFA.
In Mellon, the Court dismissed a lawsuit brought by Massachusetts
to challenge the Maternity Act, under which the federal government
gave grants to states providing certain aid to mothers. Mellon is a
confusing tangle of different legal theories, 157 and is best known today
for declaring that federal courts will not recognize taxpayer standing.
but Not Forgotten,64 STAN. L. REv. 89, 108 (2012).

155. Commonwealth ofVa. v. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d 253,271 (4th Cir. 2011).
156. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). In their briefs before the Supreme
Court in the PPACA litigation, Florida and other state respondents urged the Court to reconsider
Mellon. Br. for State Resps. on Anti-Injunction Act, Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida,

No. 11-398 at 31-32; Reply Br. for State Resps. Anti-Injunction Act, Dept. of Health & Human
Servs. v. Florida, No. 11-398, at 11. The Court did not address the issue.
157. See State Parens Patriae Standing in Suits Against Federal Agencies, 61 MINN L.
REv. 691, 699 n.33 (1977).
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But the Court also declared that the federal government, and not the
states, represents the citizens as parenspatriae:
We come next to consider whether the suit may be maintained by
the State as the representative of its citizens. To this the answer is
not doubtful. We need not go so far as to say that a State may
never intervene by suit to protect its citizens against any form of
enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress; but we are
clear that the right to do so does not arise here .... [T]he citizens
of Massachusetts are also citizens of the United States. It cannot
be conceded that a State, as parenspatriae,may institute judicial
proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the
operation of the statutes thereof. While the State, under some
circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the protection of its
citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in
respect of their relations with the Federal Government. In that
field it is the United States, and not the State, which represents
them as parens patriae, when such representation becomes
appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must
look for such protective measures as flow from that status.
What exactly this means-and what Mellon actually stands for-is
crucial to understanding why the Fourth Circuit was wrong to conclude
that it barred Virginia from challenging the Individual Mandate.
A. Mellon as a PoliticalQuestion Case
The first thing one notices about Mellon is that unlike in the PPACA
case, Massachusetts did not claim that the Maternity Act interfered with
any state law. Instead, the state was arguing only that the federal
government was acting beyond its enumerated powers-and thus was
asking the Court "to adjudicate .. . not quasi-sovereign rights actually
invaded or threatened, but abstract questions of political power, of
sovereignty, of government."' 5 9 Such abstract matters are nonjudiciable, because courts can only review the constitutionality of
federal laws when a state alleges "some direct injury suffered or
threatened, presenting a justiciable issue,"
and "not merely" when the
' 60
way."'
indefinite
some
in
state "suffers
This is the ordinary language of concreteness and particularity,
applicable to any litigant. It does not speak to any question of whether a
state may ever have standing. On the contrary, this language suggests
158.
159.
160.

Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485-86 (citation omitted).
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 488.
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that, had the state actually exercised its sovereignty in a manner that
conflicted with the Maternity Act, the Court would have been able to
hear the case. In fact, that interpretation is consistent with other cases of
the same period which denied standing to states challenging allegedly
ultra vires federal acts, without asserting any concrete and
particularized injury. For example, in Texas v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Court dismissed the state's challenge because it ony
sought resolution of an "abstract question[s] of legislative power."'U
"[O]nly where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of judicial
cognizance, are being, or about to be, affected prejudicially by the
application or enforcement of a statute," could the judicial power be
invoked. 162 Additionally, in New Jersey v. Sargent, the Court ruled that
the state lacked standing to challenge a federal water regulation that
would interfere with its sovereign authority over its waterways.' 63 The
Court rejected standing not because states cannot challenge ultra vires
federal action, but because the state had made "no showing that it has
determined on or is about to proceed with any definite project... [or is]
now taking or about to take any definite action respecting waters
bordering on or within the state."' 64 Although New Jersey argued that
the federal law "pass[ed] beyond the field of congressional power and
invad[ed] that reserved to the state," the Court lacked power to
adjudicate the validity of the law "until [the state 's sovereign interests]
are given or are about to be given some practical application and
effect.' 65
Mellon's focus on the abstractness of the state's asserted injury puts
the case more in line with the political question doctrine than with any
hard rule against states asserting sovereign interests against the federal
government. 166 David Currie noted that Mellon perpetuated "confusion
between political questions and standing" by "denying a state standing"
while simultaneously "declar[ing] that the 'question, as it is thus
presented, is political and not judicial in character."' 167 The Supreme
8
Court
seems as
to political
have agreed.
In Baker
Carr,16
characterized
and Sargent
question
cases,v.which
the itparties
did not Mellon
161. Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158, 162 (1922).
162. Id.
163. New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 334 (1926).
164. Id. at 339.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. See also Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending: The Role of Legal and
Equitable Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001) (Mellon "confuses standing with political
question."). Mellon was recognized as actually a political question case quite early on. See, e.g.,
Melville Weston, PoliticalQuestions, 38 HARV. L. REV. 296,323-25 (1924).
167. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS 1789-1888 at 304 n.121 (1985) (quoting Mellon, 262 U.S. at 483).
168. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 286 (1962) (emphasis added).
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claim infringement of an interest particular and personal to
[themselves], as distinguished from a cause of dissatisfaction
with the general frame and functioning of government-a
complaint that the political institutions are awry. What renders
cases of this kind non-justiciable is not necessarily the nature of
the parties to them ... nor is it the nature of the legal question
involved, for the same type of question has been adjudicated
when presented in other forms of controversy. The crux of the
matter is that courts are not fit instruments of decision where
what is essentially69at stake is the composition of those large
contests of policy.
Even Justice Sutherland later explained that "[t]he principle
established" in Mellon was that courts have "no power to consider
[constitutionality] in isolation and annul an act of Congress on the
ground that it is unconstitutional; but may consider that question 'only
when [it involves] direct injury suffered or threatened.. .'17meaning
a
0
wrong which directly results in the violation of a legal right.
But if this is what Mellon stands for, then it is no obstacle to state
lawsuits seeking to vindicate state sovereignty when a state has enacted
a statute in conflict with the disputed federal law. Such a case is not a
parenspatriae case; the state's interest is its sovereign authority, and by
passing a statute for that purpose, the state has assured that that interest
is presented with the requisite "adverseness,"' 7 1 and in a concrete
context that is "conducive to a realistic appreciation of the
consequences of judicial action." 172 In other words, to the degree that
Mellon is really a political question case, the enactment of the VHCFA
answered Mellon's concerns about abstractness or lack of judicial
standards.
Similar considerations also prevent any possible flood of lawsuits
from allowing cases like Virginia's to proceed. In dismissing the
Virginia case, the Fourth Circuit expressed the concern that states might
exploit their lawmaking powers to demand judicial resolutions of longsettled constitutional disputes:
169. Id. at 287 (emphasis added). See also Massachusetts v. Laird, 383 U.S. 301 (1965)
(state was denied leave to file a complaint in Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to challenge
military draft as parens patriae on behalf of citizens, where the state had not enacted any
contrary statute or invoked sovereign interests.).
170. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478-79 (1938) (emphasis added). See
also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 58, at 468 (Mellon held "that issues of the
constitutionality of statutes simpliciter and injuries to sovereignty were not litigable, [and]
insist[ed] on the traditional requirements of a common-law injury.").
171. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 204.
172. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464,472 (1982).
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To permit a state to litigate whenever it enacts a statute declaring
its opposition to federal law, as Virginia has in the VHCFA,
would convert the federal judiciary into a "forum" for the
vindication of a state's "generalized grievances about the conduct
of government." Under Virginia's standing theory, a state could
acquire standing to challenge any federal law merely by enacting
a statute ... purporting to prohibit the application of the federal

law. 173
Likewise, Professor Vladeck worries that "allowing state standing"
to challenge federal laws "would create a ver real risk of converting
the federal courts into councils of revision."' 74 But these concerns are
exaggerated. Passing a statute through a state legislature is no easy task.
Both houses of the legislature must pass the bill, and the governor must
sign it. 17 5 This process is designed to ensure that a state does not lightly
enact legislation. Even if enacting a statute that confronts federal
legislation were simple, such statutes deserve to be taken seriously by
courts. When legislature enacts a statute, it represents the state's
exercise of sovereignty, and articulates the state's public policy in the
most explicit manner of which the legislature is capable. 176 Federal
courts should address the constitutional issues they raise, even if such
cases burden the court docket. Judges always remain free to rule against
a state or to dismiss frivolous lawsuits on the merits. The dangers that
result from forbidding states from challenging federal legislation that
conflict with a state law exceeds the dangers of allowing such lawsuits.
This is particularly true when one recalls that efforts at unconstitutional
nullification are more likely to flourish when states are barred from the
federal courts.
Of course, one might interpret Mellon as imposing a prudential,
rather than a constitutional, standing rule, so as to "protect [] the powers
of the federal government vis-A-vis the states. ' ' 177 But the only powers
the federal government is entitled to vis-6-vis the states are the
enumerated powers in the Constitution. When a federal statute exceeds
those limits, there is no constitutional warrant for denying judicial
remedy for the state's actual injury. To impose a prudential rule against

173.

Commonwealth of Va. v. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d 253,271-72 (4th Cir. 2011).

174. Vladek, supranote 140, at 872.
175. Actually, for technical reasons, the VHCFA became law via a gubernatorial
amendment, rather than the Governor's actual signature. See Cuccinelli et al., supra note 154, at
92.
176. See, e.g., Uniwest Constr., Inc. v. Amtech Elevator Servs., Inc., 280 Va. 428, 440
(2010) ("[tlhe public policy of the Commonwealth is determined by the General Assembly.").
177. Maryland People's Counsel v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 760 F.2d 318, 321
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
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state standing to challenge federal interference with a statute the state
has actually adopted would mean discarding longstanding precedent
that allows such cases-and it would neuter one of the crucial elements
of the federalist system: the power of states to defend their authority in
court.
B. Parens Patriae
Mellon's reference to parenspatriaestanding is still more confusing.
For one thing, while the decision appears to prohibit parens patriae
suits against the federal government, it simultaneously backs away from
drawing a clear line against such standing: "We need not go so far as to
say that a state may never intervene by suit to protect its citizens against
any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of Congress," 17 8 wrote
Justice Sutherland for the majority. Why not? If it is "no part" of a
state's "duty or power" to enforce the rights of individuals against
federal overreaching, then it would indeed be improper for a state ever
to do so in court. Also, it is unclear what the Mellon Court meant by
"rights in respect of their relations with the federal government." 179
Since at least the Slaughter-House Cases,' 80 the Supreme Court has
recognized-within some fuzzy boundaries-a distinct set of rights
flowing from state citizenship and those flowing from federal
citizenship. Certainly states have no authority to intervene with regard
to those rights that flow directly from federal citizenship and in which
the state has no privity-say, the right to participate in a federal
election. A state would be out of place intervening in such a dispute, for
the same reasons that nullification theory is invalid: because on such
matters the individual relates to the federal government directly, and not
through the intercession of the state. On the other hand, if the Mellon
Court was referring to rights generally-and particularly if it was
referring to rights that under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are
beyond the scope of federal power-then this statement cannot be true.
The federal government has no legitimate authority outside of its
enumerated or implied powe's, and it would be appropriate in such an
instance for the state to act to vindicate individual rights that are being
intruded upon. 181
178.

Mellon, 262 U.S. at 485.

179. Id. at 486.
180. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 77 (1872) ("[B]eyond the very few express
limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the States... the entire domain of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the States . . . lay within the constitutional and
legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government.").
181. See Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 588 (1847) ("States ... exercise their
powers . . . upon all internal matters which relate to its moral and political welfare. Over these
subjects the federal government has no power. They appertain to the State sovereignty as

STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE ULTRA VIRES FEDERAL ACTION

In other words, if Mellon only reiterates that the federal government
is supreme within its sphere, then the language is a trivial restatement of
the Supremacy Clause. On the other hand, if as the Fourth Circuit ruled
in Virginia, the Mellon decision establishes a blanket "prohibition
against states suing the United States on behalf of their citizens," which
prohibition is necessary to protect the "sovereign prerogative of the
federal government," and to preserve "the 'general supremacy of federal
law," '"182 then it goes too far: allowing the federal government to exceed
its constitutional limits and depriving states83of a longstanding protection
for state sovereignty and individual rights.1
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that, in the years since
Mellon, federal courts have disregarded its broad language, and allowed
States to act as parens patriae in suing the federal government. For
example, in South Carolinav. Katzenbach, the Supreme Court allowed
the state to assert claims under the Bill of Attainder Clause, even though
in doing so the state was enforcing "protections for individual persons
and private groups."' 84 In New York v. United States, states were
allowed to challenge certain actions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission as parens patriae.185 In Carey v. Klutznick, the Second
Circuit allowed New York to sue federal Census officials to press
allegations that census methods would result in a disproportionate
undercount of population leading to a loss of congressional
representation. 186 In Abrams v. Heckler, the district court held that the
Attorney General of New York could act as parens patriae to seek
declaratory relief on behalf of the state to challenge a federal regulation
that conflicted with a State law regulating insurance. 187 Noting that
States could sue the federal government in a parenspatriae capacity for
interfering with matters "'that the state, if it could, would likely attempt
to address through its sovereign law-making powers,"' 188 the court
concluded that "New York actually has addressed the problem by
legislation. .

.

. [T]he state's elected lawmakers have weighed the

competing private interests and, by statute, expressed New York's

exclusively as powers exclusively delegated appertain to the general government.").
182. Commonwealth of Va. v. Cuccinelli, 656 F.3d 253, 269 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Pennsylvania ex rel. Shapp v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
183. See Shapp, 533 F.2d at 677 n.52 (noting "ambiguity" in Mellon given contradictory
statements about State parenspatriae standing).
184. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
185. New York v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 856, 872 (N.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 331 U.S.
284 (1947).
186. Carey v. Klutznick, 637 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom.,
Carey v. Baldridge, 455 U.S. 999 (1982).
187. Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1159-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
188.

Id. at 1160-61 (quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607).
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sovereign interest." 189 The conflict between that statute expressing the
state's sovereign interest and a federal law to the contrary gave rise to a
legally cognizable injury. It is hard to see why Virginia could not also
sue when it had enacted legislation and expressed the state's sovereign
interest by statute.
Federal courts have been notably willing to allow states to sue the
laws. 19 0
federal government as parenspatriaein order to enforce federal
The most notable of these cases was Massachusetts v. EPA, in which
the Supreme Court explained that upon entering the union, states
surrender certain powers, and lose the ability to remedy certain types of
ills. 191 Thus, given a federal agency's legal obligation to protect state
interests, and the states' strong stake in protecting their citizens and
resources, the federal government's alleged failure to abide b the
requirements of federal law inflicts a legally cognizable injury. Yet
the same logic would apply where a state asserts that the federal
government has exceeded its constitutional boundaries and inflicted a
concrete and particularized injury on its citizens: the federal government
has at least as strong an obligation to abide by its constitutional limits as
it does to enforce its own environmental laws.
Thus, if Mellon did establish a broad rule against state parens
patriae standing against the federal government, that rule has been
breached too often to be taken seriously today. On the contrary, if that
precedent means that states lack standing because the federal
government, and not the states, is parenspatriae with regard to rights
conferred by federal law, then it would make even more sense to bar
enforcement cases like Massachusetts v. EPA since such lawsuits might
f93
interfere with federal enforcement discretion. A parenspatriae suit in
189.
190.

Id. at 1161.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See, e.g., Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal

v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 2d 237, 246 (D. Conn. 2005); Puerto Rico Pub. Hous. Admin. v.
U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 59 F. Supp. 2d 310, 326 (D. P.R. 1999); Kansas ex rel.
Hayden v. United States, 748 F. Supp. 797, 802 (D. Kan. 1990); Abrams, 582 F. Supp. at 1159
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1122-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
aft'd, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub. nom., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467

(1986). Other courts rejected this theory, but these decisions were issued before Massachusetts
v. EPA. See, e.g., Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 677; Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Landrieu, 500 F. Supp. 826,
828 (N.D. Ill. 1980). See also Case Comment: Federal Jurisdiction: State Parens Patriae
Standing in Suits against FederalAgencies, 61 MINN. L. REV. 691, 696-68 (1977).

191.

EPA, 549 U.S. at 519.

192.

Id. at 519-21. In Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 337 (2d Cir.

2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), the Second Circuit complained that Massachusetts v. EPA
"arguably muddled state ... parens patriae standing," but when the Supreme Court took the
case, it divided equally on the question of standing, thus averting further discussion of the effect
of Massachusetts v. EPA on state parenspatriaestanding. 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).

193. For example, in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), the federal
government sued the state of Arizona contending that a state law purporting to enforce federal
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which the state contends that the federal government is acting
unconstitutionally and intruding on the rights of its citizens would raise
no such concerns, since there can be no legitimate federal discretion
outside the federal government's constitutional powers. At the very
least, a court could address any concerns about interference with federal
discretion when it considers the merits.
If it is said that this argument begs the question, by assuming the
unconstitutionality of the statute as part of the standing analysis, before
the court has come to address that question, the same is true of the
opposite position: to declare that states lack standing to sue because
allowing such lawsuits would interfere with federal "sovereign
'''94
prerogative[s]," or threaten "the 'general supremacy of federal law, "
is to assume that the federal government can have a sovereign
prerogative or a claim to supremacy when acting outside of its
constitutional authority. It can have none.
CONCLUSION

Although the PPACA litigation was unique in many ways, the
question raised in the Virginia lawsuit will remain with American
constitutional law for a long time-just as its predecessor, McCulloch,
has remained a vital part of our constitutional law for nearly two
centuries. In future conflicts between the federal government and
individual rights-and between state and federal authority-the
question of whether and when states may challenge the constitutionality
of ultra vires federal action will require resolution. The founding fathers
expected states to play just this sort of critical role in our federal
scheme. States are not mere administrative districts of the federal
government; they are distinct sovereignties enjoying a broad and
indefinite police power-while the federal government possesses only
those specified, enumerated powers found in the Constitution. Among
the powers reserved to states by the Tenth Amendment is the power to
articulate and protect individual rights, and when the federal
government seeks to deprive the state of that power, the state should be
free to defend that power in federal court. This helps, however
imperfectly, to counteract the federal government's efforts to act
beyond its constitutional authority. The Constitution's authors
immigration statutes interfered with the federal executive discretion. But see Comment: State
Standing to Challenge FederalAdministrative Action: Re-Examination of Parens Patriae, 125
U. PA. L. REv. 1069, 1086-88 (1977) (arguing that the modem trend of cooperation between
state and federal governments gives states an interest in the enforcement of federal law that
should satisfy standing requirements).
194. Cuccinelli,656 F. 3d at 269 (citing Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 677).
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contemplated just such a device, and in one of the nation's critical early
battles over federal overreaching-McCulloch v. Maryland-the
Supreme Court allowed just such a proceeding. The primary obstacle to
states seeking to defend individual rights from federal interference
today is the confused and confusing decision in Massachusetts v.
Mellon. But that case is either an ordinary political question caseinapplicable where, as in Virginia, the state has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury-or to the degree that it is a parenspatriae case, it
can no longer bar states from seeking enforcement of the Constitution.
As Americans show increasing concern for issues of federalism, states
should be allowed to invoke judicial enforcement for the constitutional
boundaries that limit the federal government.

